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Resumo
Quando Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva venceu a disputa presidencial em 2002, ele e 
seu   Partido   dos   Trabalhadores   (PT)   tiveram   a   maioria   dos   observadores 
convencidos de que esta era uma nova fase para a democracia do país. Afinal o 
PT tinha construído uma reputação de mais de vinte anos para um bom governo 
e ética na política. Apesar disso o governo Lula tem sido severamente minado 
por   escândalos   de   corrupção,   que   surpreendeu   até   o   mais   cínico   dos 
observadores do PT e fomentou amplo descontentamento entre muitos dos 
antigos defensores do partido. Esse artigo expõe quatro vertentes de explicação 
para a queda da simpatia do PT, envolvendo: o elevado custo das eleições 
brasileiras, as decisões estratégicas da facção dominante do partido, restrições 
econômicas sobre uma eventual administração Lula e sobre as dificuldades do 
sistema multipartidário.
Palavras-chave:  Corrupção;   Partidos   Políticos;   Partido   dos   Trabalhadores; 
Mensalão; Presidencialismo.
Abstract
When Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva won Brazil’s presidency in 2002, he and his 
Workers’ Party (PT) had most observers convinced that this was a watershed 
moment for the country’s democracy. After all, the PT had built a reputation for 
over   twenty   years   for  good   government  and   ethics   in   politics.   Yet   Lula’s 
government   has   been   severely   undermined   by   corruption   scandals,   which 
surprised   the   most   cynical   PT-watchers   and   fostered   broad   disillusionment 
among many long-time PT supporters. This article lays out four interweaving 
strands of explanation for the PT’s fall from grace, involving: the high cost of 
Brazilian   elections,   the   strategic   decisions   of   the   party’s   dominant   faction, 
economic constraints on an eventual Lula administration, and the difficulties of 
multi-party presidential systems.
Key-words:  Corruption;   Political   Parties;   Workers   Party   (PT);   Mensalão; 
Presidential System.
From Good Government to Politics as Usual: How the Workers’ 
Party (PT) Lost its Way
When Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva won Brazil’s presidency in 2002, 
he and his Workers’ Party (PT) had most observers convinced that this 
was a watershed moment for the country’s democracy. The victory of 
this former shoeshine boy, metal worker, and union leader symbolised 
to many the arrival to power of Brazil’s excluded masses and the 
opportunity to put into practice the  PT way of governing, lauded as 
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participatory, redistributive, and, above all, transparent. Five years and 
several astounding corruption scandals later, few illusions remain. Lula 
won the second round of the 2006 election with 61% of the vote, but his 
inability to win in the first round is largely attributable to perceptions 
that the PT has been involved in the very types of behaviours that they 
spent twenty-five years publicly denouncing. The PT has been gravely 
wounded by the scandals, starting with the so-called  mensalão, or 
monthly bribe scandal, which brought resignations from the party’s top 
leaders and members of Lula’s cabinet as well as renewed calls for 
reforming Brazil’s political institutions. The mensalão involves allegations 
of regular payments to the PT government’s congressional allies in 
addition to illegal, off-the-books campaign donations (known as the 
caixa dois) and improper use of public funds and contracts to secure 
those donations. Brazil has seen its fair share of scandals over the years
—from the impeachment of its first democratically elected president 
after the transition, Fernando Collor, to the purported “vote-buying” that 
accompanied Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s successful attempt to amend 
the constitution to allow for his re-election—so what was surprising 
about the mensalão was the party involved.
From   its   inception   in   the   early   1980s,   the   PT   stood   for 
incorruptibility,   refusing   to   accept   the   military’s   offer   of   indirect 
presidential elections during democratization, leading the charge for 
investigating President Collor, and emphasizing clean government at the 
municipal level, where it was increasingly successful. By the time of the 
2002 race, the PT had earned a reputation among voters as Brazil’s 
most honest party (GOLDFRANK, 2004, p. 207-208; Fundação Perseu 
Abramo, 2006). Scholars of the country’s notoriously weak party system 
regularly noted the PT’s outlier status as virtually the only ideologically-
driven,   internally   democratic,   and   disciplined   party.   Lula’s   2002 
presidential campaign stressed the party’s ethics and anti-corruption 
message. Its first commercial showed rats chewing on a Brazilian flag 
and the caption: “Either we finish them off or they finish off Brazil. Ciao, 
corruption – a campaign by the PT and the Brazilian people” (MARKUN, 
2004, p. 313-314). Just a few years later, an aide to the PT president’s 
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brother was caught in Brasília’s airport with 100,000 dollars in his 
underwear
1, Lula’s finance minister and chief of staff resigned, as did the 
PT’s   president,   secretary-general,   and   treasurer,   all   tied   to   the 
mensalão scandal. How did the PT move from a party that built its party 
brand  on honesty and transparency to a party in which high-ranking 
officials were engaged in systematic forms of corruption?
Lula tried to minimise the scandal in the press, saying that the PT 
had only done what other parties do, but that is precisely the point: “In 
the end – and this is the mother of all issues – many people voted for 
the PT because the party did not do what the others do” (GOIS, 2005, p. 
14). Why would the party put its hard-fought, vote-getting reputation 
for good government at risk? Why did it change course to become like 
the rest? Or, as its conservative opponents have long asserted, was the 
PT’s supposed ethical patrimony simply a farce all along? This article 
lays out four interweaving strands of explanation, involving: the high 
cost   of   Brazilian   elections,   the   strategic   decisions   of   the   party’s 
dominant faction (the Campo Majoritário or Majority Camp), economic 
constraints on an eventual Lula administration, and the difficulties of 
establishing legislative majorities in multi-party presidential systems.
These four interweaving strands have their roots in institutional, 
economic,   and   governance   processes.   The   predominant   mode   of 
explanation in contemporary political science is institutionalist, but we 
argue that it is insufficient to only consider institutional factors due to 
tremendous economic and societal demands faced by elected officials in 
Brazil (SAMUELS, 2003; AMES, 2001; HUNTER and POWER, 2007). The 
PT’s   fall   from   grace   is   best   explained   by   the   political   institutional 
pressures that induced party leaders to change their strategies, by 
national and international markets that provided a limited range of 
options, and by intra-party conflicts regarding the strategies that should 
be utilized to govern effectively. Any one of these explanations by itself 
offers an incomplete picture. Only by looking at all four interweaving 
1 The aide also had 209,000 reais (about US $100,000) in his suitcase (ESTADO DE SÃO 
PAULO, July 9, 2005, p. 1). As the main purpose of this article is to explain the reasons 
behind the PT’s descent into corruption rather than provide an exhaustive accounting, we 
only use the names of the key politicians.
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strands can we explain why the PT fell from grace. First we must 
describe the party’s rise and acquisition of its reputation for ethics.
Rising PT Fortunes
The PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores) was founded in 1979 by a 
diverse group of activists who shared a commitment to ending Brazil’s 
military dictatorship, establishing democracy, and implementing some 
form   of   socialism.   Unions,   social   movements,   intellectuals,   and 
progressive sectors of the middle class formed the base of the new party 
(KECK, 1992). The PT was established as a bottom-up party, in which 
party   members   had   voice   and   vote   on   policy   decisions,   political 
orientation,  and  leadership  selection.  The  PT established  the  modo 
petista  de   governar  (PT  way   of  governing),  which   was   used  as  a 
governing strategy as well as a party branding strategy (GOLDAFRANK, 
2004;   NYLEN,   2000).   The   PT   placed   strong   emphasis   on   internal 
democracy,   allowing   members   to  practice   democracy  and   giving 
minority   factions   the   opportunity   to   influence   their   fellow   party 
members. Nonetheless, within the context of PT democracy, a dominant 
faction – the Campo Majoritário – emerged in the mid-1990s. Minority 
groups did have voice, but control of the PT has been in the hands of 
Lula, José Dirceu, and their São Paulo allies since at least 1995. Internal 
democratic procedures have encouraged minority factions to remain in 
the   party   because   there   is   a   shared   understanding   that   the   PT 
represents  a  new  way  of  conducting  politics  that   would  eventually 
change Brazil. While the party never explicitly defined the socialism it 
sought, it did uphold a strong ideological commitment to the inversion 
of priorities, which refers to the using of the state—local, state, and 
federal   governments—to   re-orient   Brazil   away   from   its   traditionally 
unequal, exclusionary political and economic practices.
In order to overhaul Brazil, the PT has long advocated a two-
track strategy. The twin emphases include a  social struggle, which 
occurs by building a movement from the ground up that is capable of 
engaging in direct political action to advance PT causes and an electoral 
struggle, which became increasingly important and increasingly focused 
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on elections for executive positions. Lula has been at the centre of the 
PT since its founding in 1980 and is closely associated with the Campo 
Majoritário, which increasingly favoured a focus on winning elections 
over   social   movement-style   activism   (FREIRE   DE   LACERDA,   2002). 
Indeed, the electoral fortunes of the PT have improved steadily and 
dramatically since its first efforts in 1982 (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 - PT election results, 1982-2006
Election Year 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006
Governors 0 0 0 2 3 3 4
Federal Deputies 8 16 35 49 58 91 83
% of Chamber 1.70% 3.30% 7% 10% 11% 18% 16%
Election Year 1982 1985 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
Mayors 1 2 38 54 110 187 411
Mayors in 
Capital Cities 0 1 3 4 2 6 6
Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitora (www.tse.gov.br)
When the PT won mayoral and gubernatorial offices, the elected 
officials often emphasized participatory decision-making as a means to 
invert priorities, appeal to its social movement allies, demonstrates its 
commitment to honesty in office, and thereby build a base of support by 
distinguishing itself from Brazil’s myriad other parties. The most famous 
case, Porto Alegre’s Participatory Budgeting (PB), which captured the 
attention of PT activists and ordinary citizens, rests on the principles of 
deliberation, transparency, social justice, and direct citizen involvement 
in   selecting   policy   outcomes   (ABERS,   2000;   BAIOCCHI,   2005; 
GOLDFRANK, 2007; WAMPLER and AVRITZER, 2004). More than 200 PT 
mayors and even a few governors have adopted Participatory Budgeting. 
The PT also succeeded in the 1990s at developing other innovative 
policies, such as School Scholarship (bolsa escola), which – from its 
inception in Brasília – provides targeted funds for low-income families to 
entice them to ensure that their children attend school regularly. While 
national   PT   legislators   constantly   demanded   investigations   into 
corruption by the ruling parties, subnational PT administrations let the 
party demonstrate its reformist credentials by illustrating that it was 
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capable of governing creatively and responsibly. By the time of the 2002 
election, public opinion polling demonstrated that Brazilians judged the 
PT to be the country’s most honest party by a wide margin, which was 
one   factor   among   many   in   Lula’s   favour   in   his   fourth   run   at   the 
presidency (GOLDFRANK, 2004, p. 207-208).
Campaign Costs
To win, Lula needed money. Our starting point for examining the 
PT’s unexpected descent into the politics of the expected is to note that 
Brazilian elections are comparatively expensive, at least as expensive as 
those in the United States, and possibly more (SAMUELS, 2001, p. 33). 
An avowedly socialist party like the PT in an unequal capitalist country 
like Brazil could only raise relatively small amounts of money, especially 
given a law prohibiting union donations. According to David Samuels’ 
(2001) exhaustive study of Brazilian campaign finance, corporations 
provide by far the most funds, which helps to explain why PT candidates 
for federal deputy received on average eleven times less money than 
non-left candidates in 1994, and six times less in 1998
2. In the 1989, 
1994, and 1998 presidential campaigns, the winning candidates vastly 
outspent Lula. In 1994, the first year campaign contributions were made 
public, Fernando Henrique Cardoso officially received (and likely spent) 
more than twenty times as much as Lula, and received more than 
eighteen times as much in 1998
3. In each race, Cardoso won in the first 
round. The other three major parties in Brazil – the PSDB (Party of 
Brazilian Social Democracy), the PMDB (Party of Brazilian Democratic 
Movement), and the PFL (Party of Liberal Front) – maintained strong 
and   deep   ties   to   Brazil’s   industrial   and   agricultural   elites,   which 
obviously eased their campaign financing burdens.
The   campaign   finance   story   changed   dramatically   in   2002, 
however,   with   Lula   officially   outspending   all   the   other   candidates, 
including his top competitor, José Serra, who was Cardoso’s intended 
successor. According to the Superior Electoral Court’s records, Lula 
2 Our calculations from Samuels (2001, p. 39).
3 Our calculations from Samuels (2001, p. 31).
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spent nearly 40 million  reais  compared to Serra’s R$ 35 million, and 
outspent  his  other main  competitors  by two-to-one  and ten-to-one 
margins (www.tse.gov.br). This official reversal of fortunes is interesting 
in its own right, with Lula’s campaign spending jumping from below R$ 5 
million in 1994 and 1998 to nearly R$ 40 million; but the scandal is in 
the unofficial figures, where it is estimated that Lula’s campaign raised 
R$ 200 million in off-the-books donations (ATTUCH, 2006, p. 16). How 
did Lula’s campaign coffers – official and otherwise – suddenly swell? As 
philosopher and former PT voter Ruy Fausto argues, after the PT’s 
efforts to legalise union contributions failed, and with the party growing 
and needing money for campaigns,
at   a   certain   moment   –   at   whose   initiative?   – 
businessmen (not sympathetic to the party) became 
disposed to ‘help’ the PT[…]. Businessmen do not like to 
have all their eggs in one basket, and there must have 
been indications (the lack of reality of the projects) that 
the PT’s revolutionary discourse did not have much 
future (FAUSTO, 2005, p. 211).
This   interpretation   is   seconded   by   one   of   the   investigative 
journalists who broke the scandal in mid-2005, Leonardo Attuch, who 
adds that those who spent millions to prevent Lula from winning in the 
earlier races, financed him in 2002 as an insurance policy (ATTUCH, 
2006, p. 16, 28-29). Attuch notes that the financiers gave equally to 
Serra’s campaign (his inside sources estimate that Serra also received 
roughly R$ 200 million extra-officially) and that they generally preferred 
to donate off the record.
Illegal contributions to Lula’s 2002 campaign were the precursor 
to a bigger scandal, the illegal cash payments to congressional allies 
during   Lula’s   presidency.   When   the   election   was   over,   despite   its 
fundraising success, the PT still owed R$ 20 million in presidential 
campaign costs and some R$ 35 million for governors’ races (ATTUCH, 
2006,   p.   37).   In   2003,   the   PT   Treasurer,   Delúbio   Soares,   began 
engaging in unusual financial transactions with Marcos Valério Fernandes 
Souza, a marketing executive whose firms secured loans to cover the 
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campaign expenses of the PT, and soon thereafter, its allies
4. Drastically 
simplifying, the money path operated like this: Souza’s publicity firms 
took out loans for or with the PT; the PT used the funds to pay its 2002 
national campaign debts and its 2004 municipal campaign expenses and 
to provide campaign funds to members of parties allied with the PT in 
congress, such as the PMDB, PP, PL, and PTB; and Souza’s publicity 
firms received contracts from federal government agencies, the funds of 
which they are assumed to have used in part to pay off the loans.
Clearly, the 2002 campaign was a turning point in PT finances, 
and a key part of the mensalão scandal, but while this look at campaign 
costs answers some questions, it raises a host of others. Why did the 
PT’s campaign treasurers take the risk of illegal donations? Was this a 
new practice in 2002 or did it build on past corruption? And why did the 
PT pay off members of other parties as well?
The   Consolidation   of   the   Majority   Faction:   Moderating   (and 
Corrupting?) the PT
The   second   explanatory   thread   concerns   the   group   that 
controlled the PT, the Campo Majoritário. This faction, tied to Lula and 
led by José Dirceu, gained the upper hand within the PT in 1995 and 
was able to engage in political  strategies of its choosing,  such as 
focusing   resources   on   executive   elections,   pursuing   alliances   with 
centrist and catch-all parties, and adopting moderate platforms. Since 
1984, the PT has held regular elections for its national, state and local 
leadership positions. At the national level, a majority coalition, first 
called Articulação and later expanded to become the Campo Majoritário, 
won eight of the party’s nine internal elections, with Lula named party 
president for most of the 1980s and early 1990s. Since 1989, Lula 
occupied a centre-right position within the party and he aligned himself 
with the right groups to ensure control of the party. The left wing of the 
4  In June 2005, bank documents were revealed to the press that showed Souza as a 
guarantor on loans to the PT, alongside the party president, José Genoíno, and treasurer, 
Soares, and that one of Souza’s publicity firms, SMP&B, had made monthly payments on 
the loan. At the same time, Souza’s firms had large contracts with the federal government 
(http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u70166.shtml). For details on the money 
trail, see Flynn (2005, p. 1236-1238).
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party won the party’s presidency one time, in 1993, which left it in 
control   for   the   1994   national   election.   The   1994   campaign   was 
disorganised, with leadership being shared by three different individuals. 
The 1994 election was a humiliating loss for Lula, as Cardoso rode the 
success   of   a   new   economic   plan,   the  Plano   Real,   to   a  convincing 
presidential   victory.   Lula   strongly   opposed   the  Plano   Real  and   its 
perceived success left him looking out of touch with average Brazilians.
The alleged incompetence of the PT’s left-wing and Lula’s vow to 
never again to run for president without direct control over his campaign 
led to the 1995 internal party elections that would dramatically re-shape 
the PT. For those elections, Dirceu helped create the Campo Majoritário 
by uniting the centre and right factions of the party; he emerged as the 
PT’s National President and held that position for the next seven years. 
Dirceu used his victory to consolidate the power of the centrist group, 
creating a  party within a party  to ensure loyalty to him as well as 
building alliances at the PT’s local and state levels to ensure that Lula’s 
group would continue to control the party (FLYNN, 2005, p. 1254). 
Under the direction of Dirceu’s faction and over the objections of the left 
factions, the PT: 1) moved farther away from its  ground-up, social 
movement strategy and instead concentrated its energy and resources 
on winning elections for mayors, governors, and the presidency; 2) 
moderated its national campaign platforms; and 3) began entering into 
electoral coalitions with parties that previously had been vetoed as too 
corrupt, personalist, centrist, or clientelist by the PT’s leftist factions.
By 2002, the PT’s make-over was complete, as Lula’s campaign 
made clear. The massive rallies and get-out-the-vote efforts conducted 
by thousands of the PT members in the past were replaced by slick 
television  spots  and  giant  show-mícios  (concerts  by  national music 
stars). Lula did not mention revolution or socialism, but rather respect 
for   international   contracts   and   International   Monetary   Fund   (IMF) 
agreements. The campaign slogan was Lulinha – paz e amor (Little Lula 
– peace and love). And as running mate, Lula selected the owner of one 
of Brazil’s largest textile manufacturers, José Alencar, with a net worth 
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several hundred million dollars. Alencar brought his centre-right Liberal 
Party into the PT-led coalition fronting Lula.
While some see  the PT’s growing moderation and the ever-
increasing dominance of the  Campo Majoritário  as results of internal 
party   democracy   (SAMUELS,   2004),   many   other   observers   and   PT 
insiders, especially on the left, argue otherwise (FLYNN, 2005; MORAES, 
2005; WAINWRIGHT and BANFORD, 2006). These critics argue that the 
Campo Majoritário’s external and thus internal victories were aided by 
the same kinds of slush funds (or  caixa dois) that apparently helped 
Lula’s 2002 campaign. In other words, they claim that the scandals that 
rocked Lula’s administration were similar to the arrangements that had 
been used by the Campo Majoritário to consolidate its control of the PT. 
The more successful a faction’s candidates were in winning executive 
offices   (governors  and  mayors),  and  to  a  lesser  extent,  legislative 
offices, the more paid government positions the faction could offer its 
members and potential recruits from other factions, and in turn, the 
better it could perform in internal elections. This does not imply that the 
PT’s emphasis on honesty and transparency was a farce, but that the 
political group in control of the PT, the Campo Majoritário, was willing to 
use strategies previously rejected by the PT to consolidate its control.
As Moraes explains, Campo Majoritário leaders created a “parallel 
finance network” that “operated as an instrument of discrimination and 
internal privileges without the knowledge of the collective decision-
making bodies”, directing both official and unofficial resources to party 
moderates (MORAES, 2005, p. 196-197). This explanation echoes the 
complaints by leaders of the PT’s left factions. They claim that “the 
Campo Majoritário  built its own political machine within the party to 
advance its aim of achieving more flexible policies” and that “some 
sectors of the party started to have incredibly well-funded campaigns” 
(WAINWRIGHT and BANFORD, 2006, p. 21-22; also 23, 25-26, 33). 
Thus, Dirceu consolidated the Campo Majoritário’s control over the PT, 
apparently utilising similar tactics that would be used to carve out a 
voting majority in congress during Lula’s Presidency. For the left critics, 
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then, Lula and Dirceu pulled the party to the centre using underhanded 
methods, rather than being pushed by the base.
There is some evidence to support the critics’ position. Already 
for the 1998 elections, the PT top leadership overrode the wishes of the 
left factions and a good part of the party base, at least in its coalitional 
decisions. The Campo Majoritário leaders decided to ally with the PDT 
(Democratic Labour Party), a populist, nationalist party that continued 
to   rely   on   traditional   Brazilian   political   practices   of   clientelism   and 
personalism. In exchange for accepting PDT leader Leonel Brizola as his 
running mate, Lula and the PT had to give up running their own 
candidate for the governorship of Rio de Janeiro, but could name the 
candidate for vice-governor. The local PT in Rio refused to accept this 
deal and sought to run its own candidate for governor. Indeed, the left 
factions   only   approved   electoral   alliances   with   leftist   parties   or 
progressive factions of centrist parties; they also placed great emphasis 
on   only   working   with  clean  and  honest  parties   and   politicians. 
Nonetheless, national PT leaders led by Dirceu forced Rio’s PT leadership 
to withdraw their candidate and support the PDT. Though Lula lost the 
presidential race, the PDT-PT ticket won the governor’s race in Rio, and 
it was there that the first corruption scandal linked to Dirceu came to 
light. In 2004, a videotape surfaced showing Dirceu’s top aide – then 
head of Rio’s state lottery – asking for donations from the owner of a 
bingo hall who was reputed to have strong mafia ties
5.
Evidence of earlier corruption within the PT also exists at the 
municipal level, especially in the cities controlled by Campo Majoritário 
leaders (see below). Although the PT sought to direct attention to its 
most   successful   cases   of   clean   and   participatory   government,   and 
especially   Porto   Alegre,   other   experiences   were   far   less   successful 
(WAMPLER, 2007). The PT had sufficiently strong internal discipline that 
100 per cent of large municipalities (defined as more than 100,000 
residents)   that   they   won   in   1996   and   2000   adopted   Participatory 
Budgeting, which was partially responsible for the PT’s reputation for 
good government and had become virtually synonymous with the  PT 
5 The scandal was first reported in Época (Feb. 11, 2004), Issue 300.
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way of governing (WAMPLER and AVRITZER, 2005). The municipalities 
of   São   Paulo,  Belo  Horizonte,   Santo  André,  and   Ribeirão   Preto  all 
adopted   PB   under   PT   governments,   but   none   of   these   programs 
produced levels of transparency comparable to Porto Alegre. It is now 
increasingly appearing that Porto Alegre’s PB is an exceptional case that 
is far more transparent and has a stronger commitment to social justice 
and deepening of democracy than most other PB cases (WAMPLER, 
2007). The lack of widespread knowledge about other PT-run cities 
allowed the PT to argue that the positive experience in Porto Alegre was 
being replicated across Brazil, thereby helping the party build a coherent 
myth   that   the   PT   way   of   governing   was   based   on   transparency, 
openness, and the deepening of democracy. The point here is that the 
PT branded itself as a participatory, democratic, clean, and transparent 
party and often used the successes of Porto Alegre to demonstrate how 
well   PT   officials   could   implement   innovative   policies   to   transform 
Brazilian life.
The municipalities of Santo André and São Paulo illustrated the 
difficulties faced by the PT as they sought to implement innovative 
policies at the local level that would help to extend the social struggle 
into the state but also organise themselves for key national and state 
elections. Both municipal governments had PT mayors in 2001 and 2002 
in  the  run-up to  the 2002  presidential  election.  Both governments 
adopted Participatory Budgeting but neither government invested the 
necessary time, energy or financial capital to make them successful 
(WAMPLER, 2007). Pedro Pontual, who directed PB in Santo André from 
1997-2002, conceded that “after a project was approved by the PB 
council and entered the budget, we didn’t really follow it anymore. We 
didn’t   really   understand   how   a   public   policy   was   developed   and 
implemented” (Pontual, 2003). In São Paulo, after Marta Suplicy was 
elected mayor in 2000, she relied on a patronage system that had been 
created in the 1950s but had been rejected by the previous PT mayor, 
Luiza Erundina (1989-1992). Mayor Suplicy turned over parts of the 
mayoral   administrative   apparatus   to   political   allies   to   ensure   their 
support. Her support for PB was lukewarm, at best, and the process 
REVISTA DEBATES, Porto Alegre, v. 2, n. 2, p. 245-271, jul.-dez. 2008. 256ARTIGOS
there lacked transparency (WAMPLER, 2007). São Paulo and Santo 
André were two of the most important municipalities to then-candidate 
Lula as he began his run for the presidency; the demands of running 
campaigns trumped the effort to deepen democracy, promote social 
justice, and create basic transparency. In other words, the PT in some 
cities was already moving away from an emphasis on participatory, 
clean, transparent politics. The party used its control of powerful São 
Paulo municipalities to provide support for Lula’s campaign. An emphasis 
on the importance of innovation and participatory politics were still 
present elsewhere in Brazil (Recife, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre), but it 
was  not  a  principal  focus  of  the São  Paulo  faction   of  the  Campo 
Majoritário.
The  PT way of governing, then, was adopted by many of its 
municipal governments, but that is only part of the picture. Many of 
Lula’s   2002   campaign   fund-raisers   were   active   in   the   PT’s   local 
administrations,   especially   in   the   state   of   São   Paulo,   where   they 
engaged in the same sorts of financial practices for which they are now 
being   investigated   (ATTUCH,   2006;   see   also   Folha   de   São   Paulo, 
10/31/2005, p. 1, A7). Lower-level PT officials in municipalities appear 
to have been involved in financial transactions that gave them access to 
revenues from public and private bus companies, which were sources of 
the PT’s  caixa dois  as well as more ordinary kickback schemes. In 
Ribeirão Preto, for example, Rogério Buratti, a former advisor to then PT 
mayor   Antônio   Palocci   (1993-1996;   2000-2002),   was   imprisoned 
temporarily in 2005 on charges of money laundering in transactions with 
bus companies and was accused of overbilling for garbage collection 
services (Folha de São Paulo 8/18/2005, p. 1, A4). Buratti implicated 
Palocci, who was ultimately forced to resign as Lula’s finance minister in 
March  2006,  because of  these and  related  charges of  operating  a 
mensalão  scheme of his own when he was mayor (Jornal do Brasil 
3/28/2006, p. 1).  Corruption  in the PT thus began prior to its 2002 
presidential victory, but was accompanied by genuine efforts to overhaul 
local political and policy processes. Within the PT there are reformist and 
corrupt sectors at all levels of the party organization, which suggests 
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that the PT carried both reform-minded and business-as-usual members 
into the presidency.
If the PT’s left wing found itself consistently out of power and 
outmanoeuvred by the Campo Majoritário, why did it stay in the party? 
Leftist   factions   also   engaged   in   internal   party   battles   to   obtain 
government positions and increase the size of their internal voting blocs. 
The left factions generally garnered around 45 per cent of the vote for 
the PT’s national presidency, which gave them hope that they would win 
at some not too-distant point. The left wing of the party also had 
nowhere else to go; the PSTU, which some purged PT members founded 
in 1993 as a left alternative, has never received enough votes to elect 
even one congressional representative (FREIRE DE LACERDA, 2002)
6. 
The relatively high level of internal support given to the left factions also 
established their continuing importance within the party, which meant 
that   the  Campo   Majoritário  could   not   ignore   them   in   an   eventual 
distribution of national government posts. This leads to our third and 
fourth   interweaving   strands:   economic   constraints   and   multi-party 
presidentialism.
Maintaining Austerity and Alliances in a Multi-Party Presidential 
System
After Lula won in October 2002, he and his top advisors had two 
months to put together his cabinet before the January inauguration. 
They faced several countervailing pressures. First, as detailed below, in 
order   to   placate   the   financial   markets,   Lula   had   committed   to 
maintaining fiscal austerity during his campaign, and his cabinet and 
policy choices were expected to reflect this commitment. Second, Lula 
not only had  to  satiate the  Campo  Majoritário’s  desire for cabinet 
6 Two years after Lula’s victory in 2002, several members of left factions within the PT 
bolted the party following the PT’s expulsion of a senator and three federal deputies who 
had voted against a government-proposed social security reform. They formed a new 
party, the PSOL (Party of Socialism and Liberty), which managed to win three seats in the 
chamber of deputies in the 2006 elections (with just 1.2 per cent of the vote). The PSOL’s 
presidential candidate came in third, with roughly seven per cent of the vote. Some 
charismatic politicians of the left might find a home in the PSOL, but the poor showing of 
their legislative candidates will likely make PT dissidents more carefully consider their 
attacks on President Lula’s policies.
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positions but also appease the left factions, who had swallowed his 
overtures to the right and compromises with capital in the hope of 
rewards. Third, Lula was expected to dole out posts to members of his 
electoral alliance, as is traditionally done in Brazil’s multi-party system, 
where no president arrives to office without a coalition behind him 
(HUNTER and POWER, 2005). A fourth apparent consideration was that, 
as mentioned above, the PT’s coffers were R$ 55 million in the red. The 
solution, it seems, included increasing the size of the cabinet, up to 36 
members   from   Cardoso’s   21,   and   the  mensalão  scheme,   involving 
various government offices, public contracts, and regular side payments 
to those under-rewarded with administrative posts (RAILE, PEREIRA, 
and POWER, 2006). The 36 cabinet slots were used to reward members 
of the PT and their closest allies while the mensalão scheme was used to 
attract potential allies in the national legislature.
As the early opinion polls of the 2002 presidential campaign 
showed Lula gaining a strong lead, foreign investors began showing 
signs of nervousness about the future Brazilian government’s ability and 
willingness to make its debt payments. Their fears were stoked by 
Argentina’s default in 2001, Brazil’s low level of reserves, and by the 
PT’s prior proposals for debt moratoria or renegotiations. Despite Lula’s 
moderate   platform   and   business   suits,   as   his   poll   numbers 
strengthened,   Brazil’s   currency   weakened   and   investment   banks 
stopped recommending Brazilian bonds. Martínez and Santiso cite a 
report by BCP Securities from late May called Da Lula Monster in which 
analyst Walter Molano writes: “there seems to be a sense of panic as 
economic agents realise that Lula will win the elections” (MARTINEZ and 
SANTIZO, 2003, p. 371). In June, Lula’s campaign issued a statement 
promising  that, if elected  president,  Lula would not  employ capital 
controls, would not renegotiate the external debt, and would maintain 
the Cardoso government’s financial commitments. This Letter to the 
Brazilian People (Carta ao Povo Brasileiro), derided as the Letter to Calm 
the Bankers (Carta para Acalmar Banqueiro) by its critics, seems not to 
have had a tremendous effect on foreign investors, though it caused a 
stir in Brazil. By the following month, Brazil’s currency, the  real, had 
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dropped to 3.50 to the dollar from a level of 2.30 at the start of the 
year,   investment   banks   continued   downgrading   Brazil’s   bonds,   and 
capital flight doubled from June’s levels (MARTINEZ and SANTIZO, 2003, 
p. 370, 373). It was not until the Central Bank raised interest rates, the 
IMF announced a $30 billion loan that had the explicit support of the US 
government, and Lula and the other presidential candidates agreed to 
respect the terms that the  real  recovered some ground (COUTO and 
BAIA, 2006, p. 16; MARTINEZ and SANTISO, 2003, p. 374). The IMF 
loan was structured so that most of the money would be dispersed well 
after the inauguration in 2003 to encourage the new president to honour 
the agreement’s targets for a budget surplus of 3.75 per cent (dedicated 
to repaying the debt) and a low inflation rate.
Thus,   once   elected,   Lula   found   the   government   in   a  fiscal 
straitjacket,   as   Samuels   (2003)   predicted   for   Cardoso’s   successor. 
Samuels details several vicious circles trapping Brazil’s government: to 
maintain stable exchange and inflation rates as well as attract foreign 
investment, Lula would have to maintain high interest rates; in turn, this 
increases government debt, which scares off investment dollars; and to 
jumpstart the stagnant economic economy and attend to the needs of 
poor Brazilians, Lula would need to increase social spending, yet this 
interferes with the budget surplus requirements to pay off the debt 
(SAMUELS,   2003).   Samuels   argues:   “If   the   government   does   not 
maintain budget surpluses, the debt level may rise, creating downward 
pressure on the real and thus upward pressure on prices and interest 
rates,   perpetuating   or   even   worsening   the   vicious   circle   of   debt” 
(SAMUELS, 2003, p 567).
The tight constraints on Lula’s future administration had been 
made clear by the financial markets during the campaign, yet they were 
still jittery about Lula’s policy direction after the election. To end all 
doubts,   Lula’s   team   sent   even   stronger   signals   about   the   PT 
administration’s   commitment   to   austerity:   it   announced   that   the 
government’s target budget surplus would be 4.25 per cent, even higher 
than the IMF had required, and that the top economic positions would be 
filled by businessmen and technocrats approved of by Wall Street and 
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BOVESPA.   Eight   members   of   Lula’s   36-member   cabinet   were 
technocrats without party affiliation, and nine of 37 if one includes the 
President of the Central Bank (COUTO and BAIA, 2006, p. 7).
In order to sell the PT left on the capitulation to the financial 
markets, Lula’s group took two tacks. It presented the policy continuity 
with the Cardoso government as both unavoidable, given economic 
constraints, and short-term (WAINWRIGHT and BANFORD, 2006, p 28). 
And it gave several cabinet seats to leaders of the left factions and to 
more   leftist   members   of   the  Campo   Majoritário.   After   ensuring   a 
market-friendly economic team and a space for the left, Lula’s group 
needed to secure the Campo Majoritário’s dominance in the government 
– granting it twelve of the PT’s 20 seats – but this left little room for the 
eight   other   parties   that   had   supported   Lula   in   round   two   of   the 
presidential race. In Lula’s first cabinet, each alliance partner (save one 
tiny party) only received one seat. More importantly, the two largest 
potential   congressional   allies   for   the   PT   government   were   initially 
excluded (COUTO and BAIA, 2006, p 4, 7).
Typically,   Brazilian   presidents   distribute   cabinet   seats   to 
members of their coalition in order to build a congressional majority. In 
the country’s democratic history (including the Second Republic from 
1946-1964), only one president’s party has had a majority on its own 
(which lasted just a year), given that more than a dozen parties are 
generally represented in the congress. In the 2002 election, nineteen 
parties won seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and ten in the Senate. 
The PT was the largest party in the Chamber, but had just 91 seats, a 
great distance from the 257 that it needed to establish a majority. 
Including Lula’s alliance partners, the PT congressional coalition only 
reached 219 seats. Eventually, Lula brought the third-largest party in 
the Chamber, the PMDB (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement), 
into his cabinet in order to achieve a congressional majority, but he only 
gave the party two seats. According to Raile, Pereira and Power (2006), 
the disproportionality between the number of cabinet seats granted to 
Lula’s   coalition   members   and   the   number   of   congressional   seats 
coalition members controlled created the necessity of  side-payments. 
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Like Goes (apud FLYNN, 2005), they compare the party composition in 
the cabinets of Lula and Cardoso. Raile, Pereira and Power (2006) show 
that Lula’s cabinet was more disproportional than any other since 1988, 
as well as being virtually monopolised by the president’s party; this 
decreased his ability to keep his coalition partners happy – and voting 
with him in congress– and pushed the government to buy loyalty by 
other means (RAILE, PEREIRA, and POWER, 2006)
 7.
During   his   hearing   before   the   Congressional   Investigation 
Committee, the PT’s treasurer, Soares, admitted providing money to 
congress members in the PT and other parties, but he argued that the 
payments were not bribes but were to help with campaign costs (Estado 
de São Paulo, 7/21/2005, p. 1, A5). We may never know who invented 
the idea of side-payments. Was it the PT leadership, searching for a way 
to maintain its internal and external coalitions? Or was it Souza, who 
presented the idea to the PT treasurer as a way out of campaign debts 
both for the PT and its allies? The latter idea sounds plausible, given 
that  Souza  has been  formally  charged  with orchestrating  a  similar 
scheme for the PSDB in Minas Gerais four years earlier.
8 One thing is 
clear: these needs – for a way to reward internal and external allies and 
for funds to cover campaign costs – emerged simultaneously. Together, 
they pushed the PT leadership into risking the party’s reputation for 
clean government. The Campo Majoritário’s support for illegal activities 
temporarily strengthened the party by retiring campaign debts while 
also allowing President Lula to cobble together legislative majorities. The 
PT, formed with a large union and social movement base to transform 
Brazil, was ultimately induced by economic, institutional, and social 
pressures to engage in the very behaviours that the party had been 
established to reform.
7 Strengthening this interpretation is the fact that large bank withdrawals made by Souza’s 
firm in 2003 and 2004 coincide with important votes in congress (CORREIO BRAZILIENSE, 
jul. 05, 2005, p. 1-6).
8 According to the Attorney General who brought the charges in November 2007, Antonio 
Fernando de Souza, the Minas operation “served as the ‘origin and laboratory’ of the PT 
mensalão” (ESTADO DE SÃO PAULO, nov. 23, 2007, p. 1, A4-A6).
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Conclusion
The   PT’s   fall   from   grace   is   best   explained   by   the   domestic 
institutional   pressures   that   induced   party   leaders   to   change   their 
political strategies, by national and international markets that provided a 
limited range of options, and by intra-party conflicts regarding the 
strategies that should be utilized to govern effectively and win national 
power. These are overlapping factors that led the PT to turn to illegal 
activities as a way to fund their campaigns and establish legislative 
majorities. Recognizing the party’s extreme disadvantage in campaign 
finance, and thus in elections generally, the dominant faction’s leaders 
began moderating the PT’s rhetoric and policies in order to attract 
campaign contributions both on and off the books, first at the local level 
in select cities, and later at the national level. The Campo Majoritário 
leadership  used   its  financial  advantages   over  the other  factions  to 
reward its supporters and enhance its position in internal struggles 
concerning the party’s ideological direction. The negative reaction to 
Lula’s candidacy by international financial markets strengthened the 
Campo Majoritário’s efforts to push the PT to the centre and constrained 
Lula’s policy and cabinet choices. At the same time, the left factions’ 
internal strength meant that the Lula government would have to reward 
it somehow as well, and cabinet seats became the reward. As Lula took 
office, these pressures combined with the party’s campaign debts and 
the need to build a legislative majority without using the traditional 
method of distributing cabinet positions pushed the leadership to move 
beyond taking illegal campaign contributions and supporting the Campo 
Majoritário’s own members to buying the support of other parties.
As of December 2007, the only formal punishment of those 
involved in the mensalão was the expulsion from Congress of several 
deputies (from various parties, including the PT) and the expulsion from 
the PT of Soares. Many other PT figures resigned from their positions in 
the Congress, in the party (including the PT president José Genoíno), 
and in the administration (including the chief of staff José Dirceu as well 
as the finance minister Antônio Palocci). In August 2007, the Federal 
Supreme Court indicted 40 politicians and businessmen in relation to the 
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mensalão, including Soares, Genoíno, Dirceu, and Souza. However, as 
Taylor   (Forthcoming   2009)   notes,   despite   several   highly   publicised 
corruption scandals, including the impeachment of a sitting president in 
1992, very few national politicians have served jail time since the return 
to   democracy.   Taylor   argues   that   Brazil’s   accountability   institutions 
emphasise investigating corruption allegations, but none focuses on on-
going monitoring to prevent corruption or on punishing those found 
guilty. The impunity of Brazilian politicians surely contributed to the 
calculations of the individual leaders who orchestrated the  mensalão. 
Indeed, the principal players linked to the mensalão will likely emerge 
relatively   unscathed,   without   paying   much   of   a   price   for   their 
involvement.
Results   of   the   2006   general   elections   mostly   bear   this   out. 
Genoíno and Palocci were both elected as federal deputies, as was 
Genoíno’s brother (whose aide had been caught with money in his 
underwear).   Lula,   who   faced   threats   of   impeachment   from   the 
opposition parties after the scandal broke, went on to win re-election, 
again in the second round, and again with 61% of the valid vote. In 
their analysis of the 2006 race, Hunter and Power (2007, p. 11-14) 
suggest that Lula’s success in avoiding the taint of scandal derived from 
voters’ lack of access to information, low levels of education, and the 
material gains among Brazil’s largest constituency: the poor, especially 
the rural poor in the Northern and Northeastern states. Lula appears to 
have   been   punished   by   more   highly   educated,   well-to-do   voters, 
especially in the richer Southern states that contribute fewer voters 
overall, but Lula’s appeal as a member of the working class who had 
improved the purchasing power of low-income Brazilians, led to his 
wide-spread support among poor voters in the North and Northeast 
(SAMUELS, 2008).
However, the PT as a collective has paid dearly. Many of its top 
leaders   resigned.   Eight   deputies,   a   senator,   and   several   hundred 
prominent members abandoned the PT to create a new party on the left, 
the PSOL (Party of Socialism and Liberty), which won enough votes to 
prevent a first-round victory for Lula in the 2006 presidential campaign 
REVISTA DEBATES, Porto Alegre, v. 2, n. 2, p. 245-271, jul.-dez. 2008. 264ARTIGOS
(see fn 6). Their exit began before the mensalão broke, but the scandal 
and the PT’s unwillingness to change leadership afterwards helped push 
them   to   the   door.   Support   from   hundreds   of   thousands   of   social 
movement   activists   has   also   waned,   as   the   largest   movement 
organizations have published condemnations of the PT’s failures in office 
(HOCHSTETLER, 2006 p. 21-22). Major social movements did back Lula 
in the second round of the 2006 election, but more as a defence against 
the alternative than as an enthusiastic endorsement. If a non-PT ethical 
movement develops, it will most likely emerge from these civil and 
political   society   sectors,   as   they   work   to   check   abuses   of   power 
committed by government officials, including their former allies now 
working within Lula’s government.
In the 2006 congressional elections, the PT lost over two million 
voters (13 percent of its 2002 electorate) and saw the party bench 
reduced to under 16 percent from over 18 percent of the seats in the 
lower house of congress, where it no longer holds even a plurality. The 
2006 election results revealed that the PT’s constituency has shifted, 
with the strongest base of support moving from the PT’s origins in the 
richer and more industrialized southern states like São Paulo and Rio 
Grande do Sul to the poorest regions of the Northeast and North, where 
the party won five governorships (including Bahia, one of the country’s 
most populous) and Lula received his highest vote shares
9. This shift 
was likely driven by the PT government’s creation of the beginnings of a 
welfare state – particularly the bolsa família (family grant) program. The 
ten states where Lula received the highest percentage of the vote in the 
first   round   of   the   election   were   the   ten   states   with   the   highest 
percentages of families benefited by the  bolsa família  (NASCIMENTO, 
2006). It appears that the  principal element left from the  PT way of 
governing is (re)distribution, albeit in small amounts. Lula’s re-election 
in 2006 offers hope to only the most optimistic that the PT will be able 
to transform traditional political processes that the PT had long derided.
9  Interestingly, in the legislative elections, the PT continued to perform better in its 
traditional urban, industrialized strongholds than in the rural areas of the North and 
Northeast (HUNTER and POWER, 2007, p. 8) that now favor Lula and PT candidates for 
governor.
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The PT lost its ability to distinguish itself from other Brazilian 
parties on ethical grounds. In the 2006 election campaign, Lula rebutted 
the   opposition’s   accusations   against   him   with   charges   of   his   own 
regarding their alleged corruption. The PT campaign accused Lula’s main 
opponent, Geraldo Alckmin (Party of Brazilian Social Democracy, PSDB), 
of covering up corruption during his term as governor of São Paulo 
based on the PSDB’s record of blocking dozens of state congressional 
investigations. And Lula revived claims of corruption under the Cardoso 
presidencies, including allegations that deputies were paid to support 
the amendment allowing presidential re-election, that banks received 
preferential treatment during the devaluation of the real, and that the 
regional development agencies Sudam and Sudene illegally diverted 
public resources.
Lula’s election as president in 2002 offered petistas the hope of 
increasing their political power and transforming Brazilian politics. While 
the PT will continue as one of the country’s most important political 
parties, Brazil has transformed the PT more than the PT has transformed 
Brazil.   Most   importantly,   the   PT   has   lost   its   reputation   for   clean 
government. The PT way of governing was explicitly designed to allow 
interested citizens to be involved in public expenditures planning and 
day-to-day monitoring. The resistance of the PT national leadership to 
initiate any substantive reform efforts in these directions suggests that 
the impulse to reform Brazilian institutions is no longer a core feature of 
the PT’s politics. The absence of a drive to overhaul Brazilian politics is 
perhaps   the   most   significant   result   of   Lula’s   ascendancy   to   the 
presidency; the party that most stridently sought reform is now led by 
individuals and groups who are quite willing to play politics using long-
standing traditions and practices. The PT set out, in the early 1980s, to 
finish off corruption and lead Brazil in a new direction. Having gained the 
presidency twenty years later, the apparent willingness of PT leaders to 
use   corrupt   methods   as   basic   components   of   their   electoral   and 
governing strategies suggests that the distinctive PT way of governing 
has   ended   and   that   Brazil’s   traditional   politics   remain   entrenched. 
Further scandals after the  mensalão  – the ambulance mafia scandal 
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involving scores of congressional representatives from several parties, 
including the PT, and  dossier-gate, in which members of Lula’s re-
election   campaign   attempted   to   purchase   apparently   fraudulent 
evidence of a rival’s involvement in the ambulance mafia – continue to 
tarnish the PT’s image, probably making future attempts by the party to 
renew   its   anti-corruption   stance   unfeasible.   Indeed,   from   being 
perceived as Brazil’s most honest party, the PT is now seen as being the 
most corrupt (Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2006).
Efforts to promote the PT way of governing are likely to be taken 
up outside the PT or far from the national leadership. It is possible that 
reform movements will arise anew within the PT. Efforts in this direction 
began in 2005 for the PT’s internal elections, as candidates for the party 
presidency   called   for   a   refounding   of   the   party,   yet   the  Campo 
Majoritário’s candidate won. In early 2007, in anticipation of the Third 
Party Congress to be held in August, some PT factions began launching 
calls for ending the impunity of those involved in the  mensalão  and 
ending the dominance of the Campo Majoritário and the São Paulo group 
(Folha de São Paulo, 2/11/2007,p. 1, A4; Gazeta Mercantil, 4/5/2007, p. 
A8). Yet the major ethics reform candidate did not even make it to the 
second round of internal elections for president in December. Still, even 
if internal reformers are able to wrest control away from the  Campo 
Majoritário,   they   will   now   have   a   more   difficult   time   convincing   a 
sceptical public that the PT is different from other political parties. The 
national   PT   leadership   has   mired   the   party   in   corruption,   thereby 
suggesting that non-PT actors will take the lead in the effort to promote 
transparency, honesty, and openness in governmental affairs.
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